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Abstract:
From a french pannel of manufacturing firm,  this article aims to show that the terms of the
debate on the capitalization of small manufacturing firms ought to be clarified.
These firms are often said to be undercapitalized, because in relative terms their capital
spending is often similar, or even greater, than that of their larger competitors. This means that
their earnings are depleted by the higher depreciation charges for maintaining their fixed assets.





· A company can consolidate or increase its financial autonomy by calling on its
shareholders and/or generating earnings, which can then be capitalized. This implies that the
company has ready access to the capital market (or that its main shareholders are able to raise
funds easily) and/or that its business and financial performances produce the necessary
earnings. However, a firm's financial autonomy, as measured by its capitalization, is not
synonymous with higher profits, and is therefore not wholly relevant in assessing the soundness
of the company.
· In the early 1980s, the gross return on equity of small manufacturing firms, and
especially that of the smallest companies, was superior to that of their larger competitors
(Bardos M., Cordier J.; 1991). From 1986 on, the gap narrowed appreciably as large
companies substantially improved their gross return on equity. This was done mainly by
reducing the proportion of payroll costs in their value added (Vieille J.N.; 1992 and Artus P.;
1992). The smallest manufacturing firms achieved much less of an improvement, chiefly
because of a less favourable division of value added and a higher level of debt
2. However,
smaller companies have been more effective in promoting employment.
· Even though the balance sheets of small companies may suggest that they are
undercapitalized, an analysis of their business and financial behaviour shows that their return
on capital invested and return on equity are comparable, or even superior, to those of large
companies. In other words, the potential expected gain from a holding in a small
manufacturing firm seems to be as high as that for a much larger company. However, the
realization of this gain, and the capitalization of earnings, will depend firstly on the amount of
capital spending, which determines the depreciation charges, and secondly on the dividend
policy.
                                                       
1 Small manufacturing firms here are defined as companies with less than 500 employees and more than 20. This
excludes companies in their start-up phase and companies with less than 20 employees.
2 See the feature "Crise, comment en sortir?" in l'Expansion of 4-17 March 1993, in particular the articles by Jean
Boissonnat, Jacques Barraux and Michel Aglietta.2
1. EQUITY GUARANTEES THE SOLVENCY OF A COMPANY BUT NOT ITS
RATE OF RETURN...
The prime function of equity is to guarantee solvency. Equity constitutes an emergency
"reserve" enabling a company and the economic agents dealing with it to meet any internal or
external eventualities. For example, in an economic slowdown, companies with low debt have
an advantage over companies that opted for debt rather than equity financing. Companies that
use equity financing can spread the remuneration of the providers of external capital over a
longer period of time, whereas the companies that use debt financing have to continue to meet
set instalments. In other words, equity can be defined by three features (Manceau B.; 1992):
"- it does not have to be repaid,
- no fixed remuneration can be claimed,
- its ultimate function is to cover the risk faced by a company...".
While it seems vital for a company to hold a minimum level of equity, it is difficult to
set out in absolute terms an optimal balance between equity and debt. In practice, each
company will seek to optimize its recourse to external financing with regard to its specific
business and commercial situation. A company will take into account the cost of such
financing, the degree of autonomy that it wants or is able to retain and its development plans.
Each industrial strategy, whether aiming at organic growth or expansion through
acquisitions, has a corresponding financial strategy that determines the mix of self-financing,
debt and equity. The many possible ways of combining these various types of financing mean
that firms behave in many different ways.
The question of the optimal level of equity has been a topic of discussion for the last
thirty years, ever since the Modigliani-Miller
3 indifference theorem was published. This
theorem states that the debt and equity structure of the balance sheet has no effect on the
market value of a company. In fact, the theorem only works in perfectly functioning capital
markets. In particular, investors must be able to switch freely between debt and equity
securities. In this case, investment in fixed assets is only made if it increases the market value
of the company. This value depends solely on the comparison between the yield on the firm's
shares and the average cost of capital. The decision is therefore independent of financing
choices (De Bandt O. and Jacquinot P.; 1991).
However, markets are not perfect. Information is asymmetric and risks, such as
insolvency, arise when a company can no longer keep its debt under control. This may cause
lenders to demand additional security, or ration their lending in terms of interest rates and/or
amounts. Moreover, very few small manufacturing firms have access to these markets.
Under these conditions, the capitalization of business depends greatly on the amount of
long-term savings in France (Icard A; 1991), and more importantly in the case of small
manufacturing firms, on how easily those savings can be tapped. So, the capitalization of a
given firm is closely connected to its return on equity (Paranque B.; 1992), since the profits
generated can either be capitalized or used to pay an attractive yield to future shareholders.
However, no positive links have been shown between financial autonomy and corporate
profits (Paranque B; 1994). On the other hand, capital spending decreases the financial
autonomy of a company by increasing its financing needs.
Before analyzing the issue of autonomy, a brief review of the main economic and
financial trends for large and small firms since 1985 is in order.
                                                       
3 "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment" American Economic Review, May 1958.3
2. THE COST OF RENEWING FIXED ASSETS IS HIGHER FOR SMALL
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
4
Small manufacturing firms (SFs) are less capital intensive than large companies (LCs).
However, between 1985 and 1991, their spending on increasing their fixed assets, as measured
by the accumulation rate, was greater than that of their larger counterparts
5. Admittedly, the
level of their capital spending, expressed as a percentage of value added, was generally lower.
It may be that these companies use their fixed assets more efficiently (see below), which means
they need to draw less on value added.
6
Average* 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(%) SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs
Accumulation rate** 14.0 13.5 14.6 13.4 15.7 13.5 16.2 13.8 16.4 14.3 17.1 15.1 15.0 13.5
Debt-to-equity ratio 79.1 67.0 73.8 63.2 74.8 54.4 75.7 51.5 74.9 51.0 73.5 52.3 69.2 48.7
Apparent interest rate 13.9 11.9 12.9 10.6 12.0 9.9 11.4 9.3 11.2 9.5 11.9 10.1 12.1 10.3
Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                                          Updated January 1993
* Deviation statistically significant at 5% between small businesses and large companies, except as regards the 1985 accumulation rate.
**  Investment in fixed assets/fixed assets
Small manufacturing firms always have to pay higher apparent interest rates, and
technical problems as well as a lack of resources and time make it difficult for them to gain
access to capital markets. This means that they have a higher debt-to-equity ratio (including
intercompany and shareholder loans) than large companies. Their financial autonomy is not as
great as that of their larger competitors. It has improved since 1985, but to a less so than for
companies with more than 500 employees.
Average* 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(%) SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs
Efficiency of capital** 79.6 61.5 77.9 60.2 76.2 59.6 74.9 59.0 73.7 57.1 73.4 54.4 71.4 53.0
Gross surplus ratio*** 23.0 23.1 24.1 24.8 24.3 25.6 25.2 27.6 26.1 28.5 26.3 29.2 25.2 28.5
Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                                          Updated January 1993
* Deviation statistically significant at 5% between SFs and large companies, except as regards the 1985 margin rate.
SFs firms with fewer than 500 employees, LCs: companies with more than 500 employees
**  value added/capital invested
***  total gross profit/total value added
The efficiency of capital invested also fell between 1985 and 1991
7, and there was a
particularly marked recovery in gross surplus ratios for large companies, reflecting a shift in the
                                                       
4 Manufacturing firms with fewer than 500 employees are compared with larger firms over the period between July
1991 and June 1993.
5 Tests of the significance of the difference between means enable us to define when the deviation is statistically
discernible.
The confidence interval presented is calculated at a 5% threshold. In order to ensure that the finding is not dependent
on the normal distribution hypothesis, a distribution-free test was carried out on the median. It is only mentioned
where it contradicts the previous result.
6 In effect, we can establish a link between the rate of investment, the accumulation rate and the efficiency of capital:
I/VA = I/C x (VA/C)-1.
7 See la lettre du Groupe de Recherche sur l'Efficacité des équipments Industriels (GREFI) no. 5, November-December
1992. Measuring the efficiency of capital is a tricky matter. In a recent article in Economie Appliquée (volume XLVI,
1993, no. 1.), G. Cette compares different methods to show that "the efficiency of capital has not seen structural
deterioration that is likely to harm the rate of return on companies...". We do not entirely share his view. In fact, his4
allocation of value added in favour of return on capital. In this respect, labour management
policies among small manufacturing firms were less unfavourable to employment (Paranque B.;
1994).
We looked at three measures of business and financial performance:
- total gross return on capital invested, which divides the total gross surplus (in other
words gross operating profit plus extraordinary income and expenditure) by capital invested;
this is used as an indicator of general rate of return,
- gross return on equity, which divides gross self-financing capacity by internal
financing
8, which is an indicator of rate of return from the shareholder's point of view, leaving
aside capital spending policy,
- return on equity net of the cost of maintaining fixed assets, which makes the previous
indicator more accurate by taking capital spending policy into account, but excludes the effect
of decisions on how much to remunerate the shareholders.
Average* 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(%) SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs
Gross return on capital
invested
15.4 13.5 16.0 14.0 16.0 14.5 16.3 15.2 16.2 15.3 16.6 14.7 15.5 14.1
Gross return on equity





























Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                                          Updated January 1993
*  Deviation statistically significant at 5% between SFs and large companies.
Gross return on capital invested results from the efficiency of capital and the gross
surplus ratio, and is therefore an indicator of business performance. This indicator improved
markedly between 1985 and 1989 in large companies, but was still lower than the figure for
small manufacturing firms.
Small manufacturing firms consistently generate higher gross return on equity than
large companies. The figure for all firms increased up to and including 1989. In 1990, it
dropped sharply in companies with more than 500 employees. In 1991, the decline continued
and affected small manufacturing firms as well.
Between 1985 and 1988, in contrast to the situation for gross return on equity, net
return on equity was generally
9 lower for small manufacturing firms than for large companies.
From 1988 to 1991, this disparity tended to increase. The inversion of the rankings, depending
on whether gross or net figures are taken, stems mainly from the small manufacturing firms'
active capital investment, which made them subject to heavier
10 depreciation charges than large
companies.
                                                                                                                                                                            
corrections to the measurement of efficiency relate to the useful life of equipment, the extent of its use, and the
depreciation charged. This gives a measure of the efficiency of the capital actually used, based on its technical
characteristics (useful life, use, etc.), which may differ significantly from the efficiency of capital invested as such.
However, the rate of return requirement relates to the capital invested , and not to capital actually used. In addition, it
remains to be demonstrated that this requirement is not dependent on the useful life of the equipment (i.e. the period
in which a return on the investment is made) and that it is not proportional to it. Given the development of the capital
markets and the short-termist pressure which these markets exert on business itself, we might wonder how pertinent
the corrections made to the measurement of the efficiency of capital are. See also J. Fayolle "Cycles et trends
d'épargne et d'investissement dans une économie moyenne et ouverte: le cas de la France", Observations et
Diagnostics Economiques, OFCE review no. 45, June 1993.
8 Internal financing is shareholders' equity plus accumulated depreciation.
9 The expression "generally" indicates that despite a deviation that is not always statistically discernible, there is a
valid difference in a large number of cases for small manufacturing firms.
10 Measured here by the depreciation charges divided by internal financing (called Depreciation/IF5
Average* 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(%) SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs SFs LCs
Depreciation/IF 9.9 8.4 9.8 8.7 10.0 7.9 10.4 8.3 10.7 7.9 11.3 8.3 11.1 8.4
Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                                          Updated January 1993
*  Deviation statistically significant at 5% between SFs and large companies.
3. SMALL MANUFACTURING FIRMS HAVE LESS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
THAN LARGE COMPANIES, BUT A SIMILAR, OR EVEN HIGHER, RATE
OF RETURN
This section gives some results for the 1992 financial year, and draws the reader's
attention to the need for consistency between the objectives of the analysis and the indicators
developed for it. This consistency is essential for clear identification of the various levels of
possible interpretation, and for relevant diagnosis of the financial position of companies.
Financial autonomy measures how independent a company is from its financial
environment. Two indicators are calculated.
- The first is a gross figure derived from the methodology of the Balance Sheet Data
Centre at the Banque de France. It is the ratio of internal financing to capital invested. This is
found by adding the shareholders' equity reported on the corporate tax return to the
accumulated depreciation, which constitutes the self-financing reserves, and then dividing the
resulting figure by capital invested (internal financing plus debt, including intercompany and
shareholder loans).



















Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                             Updated February 1994
*  For each average, we have used a confidence interval of 5%; this is defined by a lower limit and an upper limit to either side of the average.
In gross figures, in other words taking into account accumulated depreciation, small
manufacturing firms have less financial autonomy than large companies. However, we have
shown (Paranque B.; 1992) that over the 1980s, this autonomy was relatively stable, with the
position of small manufacturing firms relative to large companies deteriorating because of the
marked reduction in the latter's debt.
The disparity in financial autonomy is mainly due to differences in spending on
renewing fixed assets, as measured by the accumulation rate (see section 2), with small
manufacturing firms spending proportionally more than large companies. Moreover, given the
relationship of small manufacturing firms to large companies, and the specific nature of their
role in the production system, companies with fewer than 500 employees have higher working
capital needs than their larger competitors, and this increases their financing requirements. In
other words, the lower autonomy of small manufacturing firms is partly due to the fact that
they have greater financial requirements and need more external financing.
Small manufacturing firms are also more likely to use debt financing because it is harder
for them to gain access to the capital markets to raise equity financing. This handicap becomes
apparent when we evaluate their autonomy as a net figure, using the ratio of shareholders'
equity to the balance sheet total: the figure is still lower than that of larger firms.6
The specific dynamics of small manufacturing firms' capital spending patterns influence
their business and financial performance.
1992 SFs LCs
Lower limit Average Upper limit Lower limit Average Upper limit
Gross return on capital invested*
Gross return on equity*



















Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                             Updated February 1994
*  The test on the median indicates a statistically significant deviation, with 50.5% of small manufacturing firms having a ratio above the median
for the whole sample, against 41.8% of large companies
Reduced financial autonomy has not prevented small manufacturing firms from
generating a gross return on capital invested that is usually higher than that of large companies.
These performances are largely due to the fact that small manufacturing firms make more
efficient use of their capital than large companies. This greater efficiency, more than offsets a
somewhat lower gross surplus ratio
11. This discrepancy is also reflected in gross return on
equity (see section 2 above).
Net return on equity
12 is lower for small manufacturing firms than for larger companies.
This is the result of proportionally higher capital spending, which generates a higher
depreciation charge as a proportion of internal financing
13 (11.6%, against 7.8% for large
companies).
If we deduct dividends paid from gross self-financing capacity, we obtain a figure for
self-financing. If we express this as a percentage of internal financing, we arrive at an indicator
of the rate of return after remunerating the shareholders, and therefore an estimate of the
earnings capitalization capacity of the company, before taking into account capital spending
policy.
1992 SFs LCs















Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                             Updated February 1994
*  The test on the median indicates a statistically significant deviation at 5% in favour of small manufacturing firms; 50.7% of small
manufacturing firms have a ratio above the median for the sample, against 38.6% for large companies.
After paying dividends to shareholders, small manufacturing firms are still more
profitable than large companies. This discrepancy even increases somewhat when we move
from gross return to equity to the ratio of self-financing to internal financing (from 1 point to
1.6 points). The percentage of dividends is higher in large companies than in small
manufacturing firms (respectively 2.5% of internal financing, against 1.7% and 18.5% of gross
self-financing capacity, against 11%).
                                                       
11 In other words, the allocation of value-added is more favourable to remunerating capital in large companies than in
small manufacturing firms , which is consistent with the fact that the latter are less capital-intensive.
12 If we calculate the ratio of net self-financing as a percentage of shareholders' equity rather than of internal financing
(which is gross), the result is similar.
13 Depreciation represents 51% of internal financing in small manufacturing firms and 42.5% in companies with over
500 employees.7
However, after deducting the cost of maintaining fixed assets, and therefore looking at
the net figure, small manufacturing firms and large companies are in a similar position (or even
one which is more favourable to small manufacturing firms in terms of the "net self-
financing/shareholders' equity" ratio
14).
In other words, small manufacturing firms' depreciation charges are proportionally
higher, while their dividends are proportionally lower. The pattern is the other way round for
large companies.
This finding illustrates two different business approaches, one is more industrial and the
other is more financial. There is indeed a specific constraint on large firms to produce returns
for shareholders. This constraint arises from large companies' dependence on capital markets
1992 SFs LCs
Lower limit Average Upper limit Lower limit Average Upper limit
Dividends/shareholders' equity 3.0 3.1 3.3 4.2 4.7 5.3
Source: Banque de France
                OBSRDE - Tel: 3(1) 42 92 56 58                                                                                                                                                             Updated February 1994
The fact that shareholders in large companies receive more remuneration than
shareholders in small manufacturing firms reinforces the distinction between companies on the
grounds of size, and reinforces the need for small manufacturing firms to offer lenders a higher
rate of return.
                                                       
14 According to the test on the median.8
CONCLUSION
On the whole, lenders, and investors in general, regard small manufacturing firms as
being riskier than large companies. All too often this assessment is made simply on the grounds
of undercapitalization It is mainly justified by the greater risks incurred by small manufacturing
firms, as seen in their proportionally higher spending on renewing fixed assets than large
companies.
The risk incurred by lenders to large companies is of a different kind: it relates more to
the total sum of capital raised than to the intrinsic risk of an individual project. The larger the
company is, the more information is available to lenders.
Small manufacturing firms are therefore not suffering from an inability to generate the
resources necessary to meet their financial commitments. On the other hand, they may be being
handicapped by the fact that their future is hard to read, in other words, that they do not
provide enough information about their plans and their capacity to ensure their own long-term
survival.
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